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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL MANSELL, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
WARD.EN JOHN W. TURNER, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 9891 
BRIEF OF RESPrONDENT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The instant appeal is from a denial of appell-
ant's petition for habeas corpus seeking his release 
from the Utah State Prison after being recommitted 
by the Board of Pardons when the appellant failed 
to comply with the terms of his conditional release. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On ~October 16, 1962, the appellant filed his 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Third 
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County. On Jan-
uary 4, 1963, a return on the writ was filed, and 
on January 16, 1963, a hearing was held before 
the Honorable Marcellus K. Snow on the appellant's 
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petition. On February 5, 1963, the trial court en-
tered findings of fact and conclusions of law based 
on the hearing, and further entered its order deny-
ing the appellant's petition for habeas corpus. On 
February 26, 1963, appellant filed notice of appeal 
from the trial court's decision 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits that the decision of 
the trial court should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent submits the following statement 
of facts in supplement to those set out in the ap-
pellant's brief. 
The appellant is presently confined in the Utah 
State Prison for the crime of second degree burg-
lary. On August 21, 1962, the appellant was grant-
ed a conditional termination from his sentence, and 
released from the Utah State Prison by the State 
Board of Pardons upon condition that the appell-
ant "immediately depart from the State of Utah." 
The termination order further provided "that if 
he should ever again enter the State of Utah for 
any purpos·e whatsoever, then this Order of Con-
ditional Termination becomes null and void and 
the said Paul Mansell will be subject to arrest and 
reimprisonment in the Utah State Prison, to serve 
the remainder of his sentence." (T. 7). At the hear-
ing before the Utah State Board of Pardons, prior 
to appellant'~s release, appellant requested super-
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vised parole; however, the Board of Pardons re-
jected the appellant's request and afforded him an 
opportunity to accept a conditional termination 
upon the above mentioned condition. (T. 16, 17). 
Appellant accepted the termination and signed the 
order of termination, which provided: 
"I, Paul Mansell, Hereby certify that I 
have read and understand the above Order 
of Conditional Termination and the legal im-
port thereof has been explained to m·e. I agree 
to abide by this conditional termination and 
do so of my own free will." 
The trial court found that the appellant ac-
cepted the conditional termination "voluntarily 
and without any coercion or duress other than tlie 
fact that if he failed to accept the conditional re-
lease, he was to remain in custody of the Warden 
of the Utah State Prison for an additional period 
of time." (T. 17). 
Mter being released, the appellant failed to 
leave the State of Utah. The trial court found that 
appellant had no intention of leaving the State 
although he had adequate means and opportunity 
to leave. (T. 17). Subsequent to his release, infor-
mation was communicated to the Board of Pard-
ons that appellant was consorting with ex-convicts 
and was in some other difficulties. (T. 17). 
The appellant was arrested on August 30, 1962 
by the Board of Pardons and remanded to the cust-
ody of the Warden of the Utah State Prison to 
3 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
serve an additional year on his sentence of second 
degree burglary. The arrest was on the basis that 
appellant had violated the terms of his conditional 
release by failing to leave Utah and having no in-
tention of lea:ving. (T. 17). 
The trial court further found that the peti-
tioner was a resident of Missi'ssippi and that there 
was not a parole compact nor prisoner transfer 
agreement between Utah and Mississippi. (T. 17). 
The appellant had been previously convicted of a 
felony in Kentucky, and had been in difficulty in 
Wyoming and also while in the Armed Forces; but 
appellant had no difficulty while residing in Miss-
issippi with his family. (T. 18). 
The trial court ruled that the Board of Pardons' 
conditional termination of appellant was a legal 
and proper condition and exercise of the executive 
pardon and parole power, and that the appellant's 
recommitment for violation of the terms of his con-
ditional relea;se was warranted. (T. 18). The court 
also found that even if the ·Board of Pardons had 
acted in excess of its powers, the whole order of 
release was void and the appellant would still be 
lawfully in the custody of the Warden until expira-
tion of his sentence or releaJse. (T. 18). 
4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE CONDITIONAL RELEASE OF APPELLANT BY 
THE BOARD OF PARDONS FROM HIS TERM OF IM-
PRISONMENT UPON CONDITION THAT HE LEAVE UTAH 
AND NEVER RETURN IS A VALID CONDITION, NOT VIO-
LATING THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
OR THE UNITED STATES. 
The Board of Pardons is a constitutionally es-
tablished body with the power to exercise the par-
don power that is exercised by the executive branch 
of government. Article VII, Section 12, Utah Con-
stitution, provides that the Board of Pardons may: 
"* * * upon such conditions, and with such 
limitations and restrictions as they deem 
prop·er, may remit fines and forfeitures, 
commute punishments, and grant pardons af-
ter convictions, in all cases except treason and 
impeachments, subject to such regulations as 
may be provided by law, relative to the man-
ner of applying for pardons; but no fine or 
forfeiture shall be remitted, and no commu-
tation or pardon granted, except after a full 
hearing before the Board, in open session, af-
ter previous notice on the time and place of 
such hearing has been given.* * *" (Emphas-
is added.) 
The Legislature has implemented the constitutional 
provision by statute. 77-6.2-3, U .C.A. 1953, provides: 
"I shall be the duty of the board of pard-
ons to determine by majority decision, when 
and under what conditions, subject to the pro-
visions of this act, persons now or hereafter 
serving sentences, in all cases except treason 
or impeachments, in the penal or correctional 
institutions of this state, may be released upon 
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parole, pardoned, or 1nay have their fines or 
forfeitures re1nitted, or their sentences com-
Inuted or ter1ninated; * * *." 
77-62-7, U.C.A. 1953, provides in its relevant part: 
" * * * Said board is further empowered and 
authorized to promulgate reasonable rules 
and regulations, not inconsistent with law, 
which shall establish the general conditions 
under which parole shall be granted and re-
voked." (Emphasis added.) 
77-62-15, U.C.A. 1953, provides: 
"When the board of pardons shall release 
a prisoner on parole it shall specify in writing 
the conditions of the pa:r~ole, and a certificate 
of parole setting forth such conditions shall 
be given to the parolee and shall be accepted 
and agreed to by him as evidenced by his 
signature affixed to a duplicate copy to be 
retained in the files of said board." 
In the instant case the appellant's release was 
conditional. Whether a parole (unmentioned in 
the Constitution) or commutation or pardon, the 
Board of Pardons, by Article VII, Section 12, is 
empowered to attach what conditions and limita-
tions as they deem proper. Article VII, Section 12. 
The conditional termination, parole, or pardon 
all emanate from the power of the executive to 
relieve a prisoner from the restraints imposed by 
the sovereign. 39 Am. Jur., Pardon, Reprieve and 
Amnesty, Sees. 2, 4, 5, 81 and 83. In Cardisco v. 




Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"The power to parole prisoners is includ-
ed within the power to 'remit fines and for-
feitures, commute punishments, and grant 
pardons.' " 
In the Cardisco case, the court recognized that 
the Board of Pardons has wide discretion to de-
termine the conditions of imprisonment and pardon~ 
and that the limitations upon the Board are only 
those limitations generally imposed by the consti-
tutions of both the State, and where applicable, 
the Federal Government. Historically, conditions 
associated with the pardon power are limited only 
in that they may not be "illegal, immoral or impossi-
ble of performance." In Re McKinney, 33 Del. 434, 
436, 138 Atl. 649 (1927); Guy v. Utecht, 216 Minn. 
255, 12 N.W.2d 753 (1943); 5 Utah L. Rev. 365, 
370 (1957). This is merely another means of not-
ing that the conditions of executive clemency may 
not exceed proper limitations. A person on parole 
is in the status of a prisoner. In McCoy v. Harris., 
108 Utah 407, 160 P.2d 721 (1945), this court noted: 
"From the above provisions, it is clear 
that a parole is in the nature of a grant 
of partial liberty or a lessening of restric-
tions to a convicted prisoner. Granting of a 
parole does not change the status of a prison-
er; it merely 'pushes back the prison walls' 
and allows him the wider freedom of move-
ment while serving his sentence. The paroled 
prisoner is legally in cu~tody the sam~ as 
the prisoner allowed the hberty of the pnson 
yard, or of 'Yorking on the prison farm. The 
realm in which he serves has been extended. 
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He is in the custody of the state and serving 
his sentence outside of the prison rather than 
within the walls. The parole system is re-
formatory and founded upon a plan and policy 
of helping the inmate to gain strength and 
resistance to temptation, to build up his self 
control, to adjust his attitudes and actions to 
social controls and standards; and it aims to 
extend his liberties and opportunities for nor-
mal living within the social fabric as his 
strength to meet new responsibilities grows 
and develops." 
* * * 
In the case of a parolee, the judgment 
is a sentence and commitment. The legal posi-
tion conferred upon the party by such judg-
ment is the obligation to serve the designated 
term in prison. Until that sentence is termin-
ated, the judgment committing him to the 
custody of the prison authorities is still in 
effect. The additional liberty conferred by the 
parole is a result of action by the Board of 
Pardons, an administrative body. The parolee 
is still in custodia legis, and under the control 
of the State Board, though outside prison 
walls. * * *" 
The same is equally true of a conditional term-
ination which is merely a parole with limited con-
dition. 5 Utah L. Rev. 365, 373 (1957); Ops. Utah 
Att'y. Gen. 56-131 (1956). The question obviously 
is whether this condition imposed on a prisoner by 
executive authority is harmonious with the relev-
ant constitutions. It is submitted that it is. 
First, a distinction must be drawn between the 
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use of a condition like that imposed in a sentence 
as distinct from when such a condition is imposed 
by a pardoning authority. Thus, in 5 Utah L. Rev. 
365, 369 (1957), it is noted: 
"The most extensive use of banishment in 
this country has been by the executive branch-
es of our state governments. This is frequent-
ly accomplished by granting a pardon on the 
condition that the convict leave the state. The 
courts which have considered the question are 
just as unanimous in upholding this practice 
as they are in denouncing the use of banish-
ment in the form of a sentence. There has 
been but one case in which such a condition 
was held to be illegal and void, and it was 
subsequently disapproved." 
A similar conclusion was reached in an article 
in 111 Univ. of Pa. L. Rev. 758, 765 (1963), where 
the author comments: 
"Judicial declarations invalidating ban-
ishment by courts do not purport to apply 
to executive pardon. The modern pardon pow-
er has been held to be analogous to that of 
the Kings of England and, therefore, almost 
absolute. Public policy places no limitations 
on the executive, who is usually not even 
required to state the reasons for his actions 
much less to justify the.m. Consequently, al-
though banishment is uniformly condemned 
when connected with a judicial sentence, it 
is upheld with equal unanimity when attached 
as a condition to executive pardon." 
The general rule is noted also in 39 Am. J ur., 
Pardon, Reprieve, and Amnesty, Sec. 68: 
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"Some statutes authorize the governor to 
grant pardons on condition that the convicted 
person shall leave the state and never again 
return to it, but by the great weight of au-
thority, even in the absence of any statute, 
such condition is valid, as is a condition re-
quiring the prisoner to leave the United 
States and not return. * * *" 
See also 60 ALR 1410, 1415. 
The appellant has cited decisions from two 
states holding such conditions, when imposed by 
the judiciary as part of a sentence, illegal.1 How-
ever, the courts of both states have upheld such 
conditions imposed incident to executive clemency. 
In In Re Cammarata's Petition, 341 Mich. 528, 67 
N.W.2d 677 (1954), Cert. Den. 349 U.S. 953, the 
petitioner sought release from imprisonment on 
the grounds that his recommitment to prison was 
illegal. His imprisonment had been terminated by 
the Michigan Commissioner of Pardons and Pa-
n6les upon condition that he leave the United 
States and never return. The petitioner did return 
and was reimprisoned. The Michigan Supreme 
Court held the petitioner's rearrest and commit-
ment proper, and the condition valid. The court 
first ruled the action of the Board of Pardons was 
proper under a similar Michigan constitutional 
provision2 to that of Utah's.3 The court held that 
1 Michigan v. Eva Baum, 251 Mich. 187, 231 N.W. 95; State "'· 
Baker, 58 S.C. 111, 36 S.E. 501. 
2 Art. VI, Sec. 9, Mich. Const. 
3 Art. VII, Sec. 12, Utah Const. 
10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
reasonable conditions could be set on pardons and 
paroles. The court said: 
"It is generally held that a condition that 
the convict leave the state and never return 
is a valid condition. (Citing authority). 
It has also been held that a condition 
requiring the prisoner to leave the United 
States and not return is a valid condition. 
(Citing authority). 
In our opinion the condition attached to 
petitioner's commutation of sentence was 
valid." 
The South Carolina courts have also so ruled. 
State v. Fuller, 1 McCord, 178, 12 S.C. Law 178 
(1821); State v. Smith, 1 Bailey 283, 17 S.C. Law 
283 (1829); State v. Addington, 2 Bailey 516, 18 
S.C. Law 516; State v. Barnes, 32 S.C. 14, 10 S.E. 
611 (1890). These are not the only jurisdictions 
that have considered the matter. 
In P'eOple v. Potter, 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. 235 (N.Y. 
1846), the defendant was convicted of grand lar-
ceny and thereafter pardoned upon condition that 
he leave the United States and never return. He 
was thereafter found in Louisiana and reimpris-
oned. The court considered that authority for such 
a condition and noted substantial English prece-
dent supporting similar conditions. The court com-
mented: 
"Banishment was first known in England 
as abjuration, where the party accused fled 
to a sanctuary, confessed his crime, and took 
11 
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an oath to leave the kingdom and not return 
without permission. (4 Bl. Com. 333; 3 P. 
Williams, 37.) This was not as a punishment, 
but as :a condition of pa1·don. After abjura-
tion was abolished, and about the reign of 
Charles II., it becam·e usual to grant pardons 
on condition of banishment, and that the orig-
inal sentence should be revived on a violation 
of the stipulations of its remission. (Kel. pre. 
4; Williams, J. Felony, VI.; 1 Ch. Cr. 789.) 
And it was usual to bind the criminal as an 
apprentice, and both he and his master were 
liable to severe penalties on his return. After-
ward the performance of the stipulation of 
banishment was enforced by requiring s·ecuri-
ty from him that he would leave the country, 
and finally the practice settled down to that 
adopted in this case, namely, that of granting 
pardons on condition, and enforcing the con-
dition by inflicting the original sentence upon 
the party, in case of violation. 
It seems then that the practice of grant-
ing conditional pardons is sustained by the 
principles of the common law which we have 
adopted as the law of the land; by the practice 
of the country whose institution in this re-
gard we have borrowed in totidem verbis; by 
the provisions of the Constitutions of the 
United States, and of most of the States of 
the Union; by the decisions of the courts of 
the United States, and of our own State, and 
of other States in the Union; by the enact-
ments of our statute for over half a century, 
and by the practice of our executive since the 
formation of our government. 
* * * 
I ought not to dismiss this part of the 
12 
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case without noticing an objection which was 
pressed upon me with much ·earnestness to 
wit, that, banishment being a punishment'un-
known to our law, the imposition of it as a 
condition of the pardon was in violation of 
that provision of our bill of rights which for-
bids the infliction of cruel or unusual punish-
ments. (1 R.S. 94, 17.) 
There is no doubt that any immoral, im-
possible or illegal condition would be void. 
This is a principle of the common law well 
established (Com. Dig. Titl Condition, D; 
Pease's case, 3 John. Ca. 333; Watson's case, 
9 Ad. & Ell. 731.) 
"And the general language of the statute, 
that the governor may grant pardons 'upon 
such conditions, and with such restrictions, 
and under such limitations as he may think 
proper,' is to be taken subject to this principle. 
His conditions must· not be immoral, impossi-
ble or illegal. No authority to impose such 
conditions has been or could be conferred 
upon him by the statute. Therefore the argu-
ment of the prisoner's counsel, drawn fro.m 
the general language of the statute, that it 
was void because it authorized the governor 
to impose unusual or cruel punishments, nec-
essarily falls to the ground. These barbarous 
practices are impliedly excluded from the 
enactment unless it should actually express 
them. (Pr Ld. D·enman. 9 A. & E. 783.) 
No principle is better established than 
this, that statutes must be so construed that 
all their parts, when in pari materia, shall be 
allowed to operate, and the effect of that 
rule on these statutes is simply that the go'v-
13 
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ernor may grant a pardon on a condition 
which does not subject the prisoner to an un-
usual or cruel punishment. Banishment is 
neither. It is sanctioned by authority, and has 
been inflicted, in this form, from the founda-
tion of our government. * * *" 
Thus the court noted the power was exercised not 
as punishment, but attendant to the executive au-
thority- a conditional act of grace. United States 
v. Wil$on, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 149, 160 (1833). In 
Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. ( 4 Dall) 14 (1800), the 
United States Supreme Court passed upon a 
Georgia treason statute. Justice Paterson, in up-
holding the statute, noted: 
"But the power of confiscation and ban-
ishment does not belong to the judicial au-
thority, whose process could not reach the 
off·enders; and yet, it is a power that grows 
out of the very nature of the social compact, 
which 1nust reside somew·here, and which is 
so inherent in the legislature, that it cannot 
be divested or transferred, without an ex· 
press provision of the constitution." (Em-
phasis added.) 
Thus the Supreme Court, speaking shortly 
after the adoption of the Constitution and the first 
ten amendments, found nothing wrong with such 
power as was exercised in the instant case, and 
felt it so inherent as to require express rejection 
before being deemed illegal. Thus, historically, 
courts have felt that the use of such conditional 
termination, as is present here, is proper. 111 Univ. 
14 
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Pa. L. Rev. 758, 768 (1963)/ Ex Parte Marks, 64 
Cal. 29, 28 Pac. 109 (1883); Pippin v. Johnson, 192 
Ga. 450, 15 S.E.2d 712 (1941); Ex Parte Lockhart, 
12 Ohio Dec. Rep. 515 (1855); Commonwealth v. 
Haggerty, 4 Brewster 326 (Pa. 1869); Flavell's Case 
8 W & S 197 (Pa. 1844); State ex rei Davis v. 
Hunter, 124 Iowa 569, 100 N.W. 510 (1904); State 
ex rei O''Connor v. Wolfer, 53 Minn. 135, 54 N.W. 
1065 (1893). 
In Ex Parte Hawkins, 61 Ark. 321, 33 S.W. 
106 (1895), the accused sought discharge by habeas 
corpus after being committed for violation of a 
conditional pardon requiring that he leave Arkansas 
and not return. The Arkansas Constitution pro-
hibited exile. Even so, the Arkansas Supreme 
Court held the condition properly within the power 
of the executive. It noted: 
" * ~ * When a citizen of another state or 
country commits a crime in this state, it 
might, under some circumstances, be to the 
best interest of all concerned that a pardon 
be granted on condition that he· leave the 
state and never return. One can readily con-
ceive of other instances when, to prevent the 
possibility of future strife between the con-
victed person and those against whose per-
sons or property he had committed a crime, 
it would be proper to impose this as a condi-
tion of the pardon. We think the constitution 
~" * * * most courts have summarily dismissed the idea that 
banishment might be cruel and unusual." 111 Univ. Pa. L. 
Rev. 758, 777 (1963). 
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does not deprive the governor of the power 
to grant pardons on such conditions. * * *" 
More recenty in 'Kavalin v. White, 44 F. 2d 
49 (lOth Cir. 1930), the Federal Court affirmed a 
similar conditional release, where the ·exclusion 
was fron1 the United States. The court noted: 
Petitioner further contends that the 
condition annexed to such pardon was illegal 
and that the pardon was absolute * * *. The 
power to grant a pardon includes the lesser 
power to grant a conditional pardon. The con-
dition may be either precedent or subsequent 
* * *· The condition imposed may be of any 
nature, so long as it is not illegal, immoral 
or impossible of performance * * *. The con-
dition that the person pardoned shall depart 
from and remain without the state is not 
illegal." 
The Tenth Circuit has most recently reaffirmed 
this position. Vitale v. Hunter, .206 F.2d 826 (lOth 
Cir. 1953). The Oklahoma Criminal Court of Ap-
peals in Ex Parte Sherman, 159 P.2d 755 (Okla. 
1945) upheld a conditional termination of a pris-
oner's sentence where it required he leave Okla-
homa and never return. In Ex Parte Snyder, 159 
P.2d 752 (Okla. 1945), a similar condition was ap-
proved. The court noted: 
"* * *In the instant case, there was no 
involuntary transportation of the petitioner 
out of the State. The parole, with all of the 
conditions set forth therein, was a matter 
which the petitioner could accept or reject. 
He gave his written acceptance and, pursuant 
to its terms, voluntarily left the State. 
16 
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In 39 Am. Jur. 576, Section 89, it is stated: 
'It is a well-established rule that a parole 
must be accepted by the convict before it 
becomes effective to secure to him his liberty; 
that is, it is for him to elect whether he will 
accept the parole with its conditions or reject 
it and remain in prison.' 
The authorities from other jurisdictions 
seem to hold that a condition inserted in a 
pardon or parole that the convict shall leave 
the state and never return is good. * * *" 
It seems clear that the judicial authorities that 
have considered the issue here presented have unan-
imously affir.med conditions the same as or similar 
to those imposed in the instant case. An analysis 
of their reasoning, and the reasoning favoring 
such action supports such use. 
First, historically there has been no objection 
to the use of exclusionary conditional releases or 
pardons. Consequently, they could not have been 
considered to be contrary to state or federal con-
stitutional provisions. Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (4 
Dall) 14 (1800); State v. FUller, 1 McCord, 178, 12 
S.C. Law 178 (1812); United States v. Wilson, 32 
U.S. (7 Pet) 149 (1833). 
Secondly, such conditions have not been deemed 
cruel or unusual, People v. Rotter, 1 Edm. Sel Cas. 
235 (N.Y. 1846). Cases subsequent to the Fourteenth 
Amendment have also so held. See especially Legarda 
v. Valdez, 1 Phili'ppine 146 ( 1902), rejecting the con-
17 
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cept that such activity is cruel or unusual, See 
also State v. W~Odward, 68 W. Va. 66, 69 S.E. 385 
(1910); Ex Parte Sheehan, 100 Mont. 244, 49 P.2d 
438. Indeed, it is difficult to see how such a condi-
toin could be deemed a punishment. The normal 
penal restraints are lifted and the prisoner set free. 
As far as restrictions on his liberty are concerned, 
he is in an improved position. Secondly, the pur-
poses of such action are manyfold, and not con-
nected with punishment. A pardon authority may 
be motivated by limited custodial or parole staff; 
a belief that removal from the criminal environ-
ment which resulted in confinement would be ap-
propriate, Ex Parte Hawkins, 61 Ark. 321, 33 S.W. 
106 (189'5); a feeling that the community is thereby 
better protected; simple incapacitation5 ; and a rec-
ognition that such remedial exclusion may moti-
vate changes away from criminal habits. All of these 
are factors which are .more likely to motivate a 
pardons authority than retribution.6 
Third, it is generally recognized that if the 
restriction on an individual's liberty has some rea-
sonable relationship to a proper governmental pur-
suit, then it is proper. The State in the instant 
case is exercising a reasonable function of its po-
lice power. Appellant has cited in his brief cases 
which indicate that there is a right of a citizen 
5 Sterilization is nothing more. 64-10-1, U.C.A. 1953; Skinner v. 
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535. 
6 Cf. 111 Univ. Pa. L. Rev. 758 (1963). The assumption that 
retribution is the motive is hardly supportable. 
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to travel uninhibited by State restrictions. How-
ever, these cases are not applicable to the instant 
situation. In Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 
(1941), the California anti-migrant statute was 
held unconstitutional, but only because of a vio-
lation of the commerce clause. If appellant's argu-
ment were valid, that he has an absolute right 
to travel, pardon or parole restrictions prohibit-
ing a prisoner from leaving a state, or going into 
certain areas, i.e., bars, brothels, casinos, would 
also be illegal. The case of Crandall v. Nevada, 73 
U.S. (6 Wall) 35 (1868), striking down Nevada's 
tax on persons leaving the state, is equally inap-
plicable. See Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S .. 270 (1900). 
Courts have consistently recognized the right, 
pursuant to the police power of a state to impose 
reasonable restrictions on travel or activity. In Ex 
Parte Brown, 243 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. Crim. App. 1951) 
a conditional release upon condition that a person 
enter the Armed Services was upheld, even though 
such condition would obviously inhibit a convict's 
liberty of travel or action. In Huff v. Aldredge, 
192 Ga. 12, 14 S.E.2d 456 (1941), a condition that 
the individual join the C.C.C. was allowed as prop-
er. If as this court noted in the case of McCoy v. 
Harris, 108 Utah 407, 160 P.2d 721 (1945), 
parole conditions do not change the fact that a 
convict is still a prisoner, it is equally true that a 
conditional release does not change a prisoner's stat-
us. Since restrictions on liberty and movement are 
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inherent in and indigenous to a prisoner-sovereign 
relationship, a restriction conditioned as the instant 
one was, is proper. Indeed, Congress has itself pass-
ed many laws restricting the right of travel, i.e. 
fugiti've felon law, passports laws. In exercise of 
the war power, the Supreme Court of the United 
States has upheld detention and relocation of seg-
ments of the citizenry. Korgmatsu v. United States, 
323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayasbi v. United States, 
320 U.S. 81 (1943). In 111 Univ. of Pa. L. Rev. 
758, 774 (1963), the author notes the limitations 
on the right to travel argument: 
"This argument, however, may go too 
far. Of chief concern is the possible effect 
of such a doctrine on useful restrictions 
analogous to parole. For instance, the admin-
istration of the Interstate Compact might be 
affected. Any program limiting the right to 
tra:vel would seem to be jeopardized regard-
less of pen\o1ogical considerations. If an 
attempt were made to protect the parole 
system on the ground that the right to travel 
is no more applicable to a parolee than to an 
imprisoned convict, the same reasoning could 
be applied to a banished convict.* * *" 
If there is a reasonable relationship between 
the powers properly exercised by the sO'vereign and 
any restrictions on individual liberty, i.e. travel, 
etc., the restrictions are proper. In Shacbtman v. 
Dulles, 225 F .. 2d 938 (1955), the court noted in a 
passport application case: 
"The right to travel, to go from place 
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to place as the means of transportation permit 
is a natural right subject to the rights of 
others and to reasonable regulation under 
law." (Emphasis added.) 
See also Worthy v. Herter, 270 F.2d 905 (D.C. 
Cir. 1959) and Porter v. Herter, 278 F.2d 280 (D.C. 
Cr. 1960), upholding executive restrictions incident 
to the power to control foreign relations and com-
pare it with the reasoning in Ex Parte Hawkins, 
61 Ark. 321, 33 S.W. 106 (1895), upholding the same 
power incident to executive police power. Condi-
tional pardon has a reasonable basis, incapacitation, 
rehabilitation, see Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480 
(1927), environmental change, and community pro-
tection, all historically recognized, and logically 
proper. 
With the obvious legal suppore as well as prac-
tical application by the Board of Pardons, it is dif-
ficult to see on what basis it could now be claimed 
that the conditional procedure imposed here would 
violate constitutional guarantees. 
In the instant case where the petitioner had 
been in difficulty in Utah, where his immedtate 
environment on release was such that he would 
be in trouble, and where parole supervision in his 
home state was impossible, it is not unreasonable 
for the Board to have pursued the remedy they did. 
In the absence of a contrary showing, it must be 
7 In addition to case law the Utah Attorney General ruled that 
such action of the Board of Pardons was proper. Ops. Utah 
Att'y Gen. 56-131 (1956). 
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presumed they acted reasonably. The appellant 
could have rejected the condition, and although the 
bargaining position of appellant was not equal with 
that of the Board of Pardons, inequality of bargain-
ing position occurs daily, but is no grounds to avoid 
a contract, absent fraud or duress, which is not 
present here. Ex Parte Snyde,r, 159 P.2d 752 (Okla. 
1945). 
Finally, appellant relies upon a recent United 
States Supreme Court case, Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, Oct. Term, 1962, Nos .. 2 & 3, where the 
Supreme Court struck down the forfeiture of cit-
izenship where an individual left the country to 
avoid military service. The court did not hold that 
expatriation wasn't a proper sanction in an ap-
propriate case, quite to the contrary, Sec. 401 (j) 
of the Nationality Act of 1940 was declared uncon-
stitutional because the procedural requirements 
leading up to expatriation did not satisfy procedural 
due process of law. The court stated: 
"We hold § § 401(j) and 349(a) (10) in-
valid because in them Congress has plainly 
employed the sanction of deprivation of na-
tionality as a punishment-for the offense of 
leaving or remaining outside the country to 
evade military service-without affording the 
procedural safeguards guaranteed by the 
Fifth and Sixth Amendments.***" 
It further implied that once procedural safeguards 
were met, expatriation would be proper, p. 39: 
"* **Our conclusion from the legislative 
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and judicial history is, therefore, that Con-
gress in these sections decreed an additional 
punishment for the crime of draft avoidance 
in the special category of cases wherein the 
evader leaves the country. It cannot do this 
without providing the safeguards which must 
attend a criminal prosecution." 
The Supreme Court has pre'viously recognized 
that expatriation may be a proper remedy, where 
a person votes in a foreign election, Perez v. Brown-
ell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958), and implied it to be a proper 
sanction for voluntarily enlisting in a foreign mili-
tary force. Nishikawu v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129 (1958) . 
. Expatriation, if punishment, may be excessive in 
some instances, Trap v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); 
however, the conditional release is not punishment, 
but control, and if reasonable under the circum-
stances, is clearly not cruel or unusual punishm·ent. 
Legarda v. Valdez, 1 Philippine 146 (1902). 
The instant case involves no claim of expatria-
tion. Citizenship still is afforded appellant, he has 
not been deprived of all civil rights; only a limita-
tion attendant to his past conduct and directed 
towards possible future conduct is imposed against 
him. 
It must be concluded that there is no basis to 
appellant's claim that his constitutional rights have 
been infringed, or that the Board of Pardons im-
posed unconstitutional conditions upon him. 
23 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT II. 
EVEN IF APPELLANT'S CONDITIONAL RELEASE 
WAS IMPROPER, HE MAY NOT OBT'AIN RELEASE BY 
HABEAS CORPUS. 
The trial court ruled that even if the appellant's 
conditional release, upon condition that he leave 
the state, were illegal, the order of the Board 
of Pardons would be null and void in total, and 
he would, therefore, still be legally held un-
der his original commitment. It is submitted the 
trial court ruled correctly. 
Whether an unconstitutional exception or con-
dition in a statute voids the whole statute depends 
upon whether it is such a 1naterial provision of 
that statute that it is inseparable from the essen-
tial content of the statute, such that, but for such 
exception or condition, the Legislature would not 
have passed the act. Smith v. Carbon County, 95 
Utah 340, 81 P.2d 370 (1938}; Sutherland, Statutory 
Construction, Sec. 2403. It is submitted a similar 
construction should be applied in determining the 
conditions applied to parole or termination by the 
Board of Pardons. Instruments of pardon are sub-
ject to rules of construction applied to instruments 
and contracts in general, 67 C.J.S., Pardons, Sec. 
11. It is a general rule of contract law that if a 
condition in a contract is void, and if that condi-
tion is essential to the 'very heart of the contract 
and inseparable therefrom, that the whole contract 
is void. It is submitted that applying the above rules 
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of construction to the order of the Board of Pardons 
in this case, that if the condition of release is void, 
the whole order is void. It is obvious that where 
the Board of Pardons refused a more controlled 
parole and offered the appellant conditional release 
or nothing, that if the Board had felt the condi-
tion void, it would not have released the appellant. 
Consequently, habeas corpus will not lie to release 
the appellant since the order of the Board of Pard-
ons, if the condition of release is void, is itself void 
and appellant is still imprisoned on his original 
commitment. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant's contentions, when examined in the 
light of previous judicial declarations, and the ob-
vious motivations of the Board of Pardons, provide 
no basis for a claim that the Board of Pardons 
exceeded the limits of its constitutional powers. Even 
so, appellant would ha:ve no basis for relief by 
habeas corpus. 
It is submitted the judgment of the trial court 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted 
A. PRATT KESLER 
Attorney General 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
Deputy Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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